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A B S T R A C T
Before about 1990, insofar as diagnostic and other medical tests were subject to regulatory oversight, it was
chiefly to ensure that they met appropriate standards of analytic and clinical validity. Over the course of the
1990s, however, regulatory reformers in the United States began to argue that genetic tests, specifically, should
also be assessed to determine whether or not they actually benefit those undergoing testing—whether they
possess “clinical utility”, as they put it. The present paper asks why this shift in regulatory focus occurred
specifically in relation to genetic tests, and why clinical utility became a key object of assessment. It answers
these questions by situating concerns about genetic tests in the longer history of medical genetics. Looking back
to the 1970s and medical geneticists' efforts to distance themselves from their earlier association with eugenics,
it shows that they adopted a particular framing of the dangers of genetic testing which would inform their
response to the proliferation of new genetic tests and the growth of commercial testing in the 1990s. In a series of
policy committees convened over the course of that decade, medical geneticists called for regulatory measures to
be implemented to ensure that genetic tests were only introduced into medical practice if they had been shown
to be beneficial to those tested. The paper follows the deliberations of those committees to show in detail how
geneticists worked within this framing to accommodate new technical capacities and regulatory opportunities.
In the course of these deliberations, they adopted the idea of clinical utility to signify the need for evidence of
benefit specifically to those tested. The paper concludes with some observations regarding how this framing of
genetic tests relates to current understandings of “genetic exceptionalism” and to more recent articulations of
clinical utility.
1. Introduction
Before about 1990, insofar as diagnostic and other medical tests
were subject to statutory regulation, it was chiefly to ensure that they
met appropriate standards of accuracy—of analytic and clinical va-
lidity, in present-day terminology. Other than that, regulatory agencies
generally assumed that medical practitioners were best left to decide for
themselves, on the basis of their own knowledge and experience,
whether and when to use such tests. Over the course of the 1990s,
however, American medical geneticists began to argue that genetic
tests, specifically, should also be assessed to determine whether or not
they actually benefit those undergoing testing—whether they possess
what came, in the course of these debates, to be called “clinical utility”.
While these efforts had only limited impact on the statutory regulation
of genetic tests, the idea of assessing their clinical utility has been
widely adopted in the formulation of professional clinical guidelines, as
well as by health technology assessment bodies charged with deciding
whether new genetic tests are worth implementing in practice. The turn
to utility as a key assessment criterion thus represents a significant shift
in ideas about the extent of medical competence and the role of
regulation in relation to genetic testing.
How and why concerns first came to be expressed about the reg-
ulation of genetic tests, and especially about their utility, remains
under-explained, however. The only author to address these questions
at any length is STS scholar Shobita Parthasarathy, in the first chapter
of her book Building Genetic Medicine (Parthasarathy, 2007, pp. 28–45).
Parthasarathy attributes these concerns to the development, from the
early 1990s, of new genetic tests made possible by novel genomic
biotechnologies. Medical geneticists feared that such tests would be
used by practitioners who lacked specialist expertise in interpreting and
communicating genetic risks to their patients, and that this would do
more harm than good to patients, particularly when effective treat-
ments were lacking. It was this, argues Parthasarathy, that led medical
geneticists to demand more stringent controls over the marketing and
use of such tests.
Parthasarathy's analysis leaves two questions unanswered, however.
First, why did such concerns focus specifically on genetic tests, and not
on other kinds of diagnostic and predictive tests that were becoming
available at the same time? Other novel medical biotechnologies—no-
tably monoclonal antibodies—were at least as fertile a source of new
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diagnostic and predictive tests, many of which involved similar pro-
blems of risk communication to predictive genetic tests. Yet while some
practitioners expressed doubts about the possible harms of testing more
generally, they did not voice the same kinds of calls for regulatory
oversight as accompanied genetic testing. Why, then, were calls for
enhanced regulatory oversight of clinical tests associated specifically
with genetic tests? Secondly, why did calls for regulation of genetic
tests come to focus on assessment of their clinical utility, and what, in
that setting, did “clinical utility” actually mean?
In the present paper I seek to answer this question by situating
medical geneticists' concerns about genetic tests in the longer history of
their specialism. As Parthasarathy observes, “the architecture of a ge-
netic test was not simply a collection of laboratory practices and ma-
chines, but also included clinical care such as how information was
transmitted to clients and what types of medical interventions had been
devised to deal with at-risk status” (Parthasarathy, 2007, p. 42). The
present paper historicises this observation. Informed by frame theory
(Rein and Schön, 1996; Jones, 2001), the paper shows that medical
geneticists' sensitivity to the informational dynamics of genetic testing
dated back at least to the 1970s, when they sought to distance them-
selves from their earlier association with eugenics; that the way they
framed the risks associated with genetic tests at that time continued to
inform their responses to the development of new genetic diagnostics
during the 1990s; and that the idea of “clinical utility” as a key reg-
ulatory requirement for genetic tests emerged as geneticists sought to
maintain and adapt that problem frame to accommodate new devel-
opments both in diagnostic technology and in the regulatory environ-
ment. It concludes with some observations regarding how this framing
of genetic tests relates to current understandings of “genetic ex-
ceptionalism” and to more recent articulations of clinical utility in the
regulation and governance of testing.
The paper is based on a contextual reading of medical geneticists'
views about genetic testing, the possible harms it posed, and how to
avoid those harms, from 1989 to 2000. The data are mostly though not
exclusively drawn from published sources. For the period 1989–1993,
when geneticists were first taking stock of the implications of new DNA-
based testing technologies, the paper draws on geneticists' arguments
and opinions published in medical and scientific periodicals, as well as
looking back to the 1975 report of a committee convened by medical
geneticists where their prevailing framing of genetic testing was pre-
viously articulated. For the period 1993–2000 it draws chiefly on the
published reports and recommendations of a series of advisory com-
mittees in which leading medical geneticists were able to air their
considered opinions about genetic tests and their proposals for reg-
ulation. It also uses materials in the Archives of the National Academy
of Sciences to throw light on the background and aims of the Institute of
Medicine Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks. The views expressed in
these sources were analysed to identify, on the one hand, continuities in
geneticists' overall framing of the problems associated with testing, and
on the other hand, the adjustments made over time to accommodate
new technical and regulatory developments within that overall
framing.
1.1. Cystic fibrosis carrier screening
In September 1989, the leading journal Science published a series of
papers that quickly became a milestone in disease genetics. Researchers
had located and partially sequenced a gene on human chromosome 7
which they called “the cystic fibrosis gene”. They also identified a
mutation—ΔF508—in that gene that accounted for a large proportion
of cystic fibrosis cases (Rommens et al., 1989; Riordan et al., 1989;
Kerem et al., 1989). Their work created dramatic new possibilities for
medical efforts to tackle cystic fibrosis.
Cystic fibrosis (CF) has been understood from the 1950s to be a
recessive single-gene disorder. Individuals who inherit two defective
copies of the gene—one from each parent—develop the disease; while
those who inherit only a single defective copy are unaffected carriers.
This knowledge offered limited opportunities for medical intervention.
In families where medical geneticists were able to map the inheritance
of the disease, they could often calculate the probability that any given
individual within that family was a carrier, and so could advise that
individual on the risks of having an affected child. Given the rarity of
CF mutations in the general population, however, most cases were di-
agnosed before any family history of the disease became evident.
Consequently, efforts to mitigate the effects of CF generally focused on
improving treatment options for children already diagnosed with the
condition, rather than on its genetic aspects (Wailoo and Pemberton,
2008, pp. 68–91).
Medical interest in the genetics of CF gained ground during the
1980s, spurred by developments in molecular genetics. By the middle of
the decade, researchers had mapped a number of DNA markers showing
linkage to the putative CF gene. Observing the transmission of these
markers from one generation to the next made it possible to determine
with much greater certainty which individuals in an affected family
were carriers—but still only in “informative” families, i.e. those with a
sufficiently well-document history of cystic fibrosis and with a suitable
marker (Ostrer and Hejtmancik, 1988; Johnson, 1988). The cloning of
“the cystic fibrosis gene” itself, and the characterisation of the ΔF508
mutation, greatly simplified the testing process. Moreover, it made it
possible to test anyone for ΔF508 carrier status, irrespective of their
family history. Some medical geneticists immediately hailed this as an
opportunity to undertake population-wide screening to identify CF
carriers (e.g. Schulman et al., 1990; cf. Kerr, 2005, p. 882). But others
urged caution (e.g. Kerem et al., 1989, p. 1079; Gilbert, 1990; Wilfond
and Fost, 1990). Their ambivalence was informed by almost twenty
years of debate about the risks and benefits of genetic screening, par-
ticularly in the United States.
In 1972, responding to calls from leading figures in the American
Society of Human Genetics (ASHG), the US National Academy of
Sciences established a Committee for the Study of Inborn Errors of
Metabolism—a large class of usually single gene disorders, many of
which become apparent quite early in life. Prompted by questions about
the effectiveness of newborn screening for phenylketonuria, which had
been rolled out—often on a mandatory basis—in a growing number of
American states since the mid-1960s, as well as by controversies about
screening for sickle-cell anaemia, Tay-Sachs disease, and birth defects
such as Down syndrome, the Committee was charged to report on “the
problems and difficulties [arising from these initiatives] and give some
procedural guidance, in order to minimise the shortcomings and max-
imize the effectiveness of future genetic screening programs” (CSIEM,
1975, p. iii; Paul and Brosco, 2013, pp. 63–91, 96–97; Lindee, 2005, pp.
28–57).
The Committee's response was coloured by geneticists' desire to
distance themselves from controversial questions of social policy,
especially their earlier association with eugenics (Mitchell, 2017).
Consequently, their recommendations reflected a strong commitment to
safeguarding the rights and interests of those who underwent screening.
In particular, where earlier eugenic programmes had cast genetics as a
tool for paternalistic and coercive control of human reproduction, the
Committee now argued that individuals should be encouraged and
enabled to use genetics to inform their own reproductive decisions.
Consequently, “Participation in a genetic screening program should not
be made mandatory by law, but should be left to the discretion of the
person tested”. Screening agencies should take appropriate steps “to
avoid social consequences of screening that may be damaging”, such as
“invasion of privacy, breach of confidentiality … as well as psycholo-
gical damage resulting from being ‘labeled’ or from misunderstandings
about the significance of diseases and carrier states”. To that end, it was
crucial to ensure that “qualified and effective counselors are available
in sufficient number” (CSIEM, 1975, pp. 1–4).
The Committee's recommendations reflect a particular framing of
the predicament in which clinical geneticists found themselves in the
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early 1970s. While new tools were becoming available to identify and
intervene in certain genetic disorders, geneticists were acutely aware
that their long association with eugenics could provoke suspicion about
their motives. The Committee framed the problem as in effect one of
trust, and the solution in terms of a redistribution of control. As far as
possible, control over the process of testing, and over any decisions
arising from it, should rest, not with geneticists or the state, but with
the individuals being tested. Hence geneticists' opposition to mandatory
testing. Hence too their emphasis on counselling, and specifically on
non-directive counselling. Estimations of genetic risk were highly
technical in nature, based in abstract theories of inheritance and epi-
demiology and usually expressed as probabilities rather than certain-
ties. As such, they could easily leave those tested feeling confused,
anxious, and disempowered. Genetic counselling developed as a set of
interpretative and communicative practices intended to help in-
dividuals understand such information in a way that made sense in the
context of their own lives, and to support them as they made their own
life choices (Stern, 2012; Paul, 1997).
The same framing informed medical geneticists' response to the
possibility of carrier screening for cystic fibrosis. It focused attention on
the informational uncertainties inherent in the available tests, and the
harms they might cause to those tested and to medical genetics itself.
The ΔF508 mutation only accounted for around 70% of all CF carriers,
with the remaining 30% carrying as yet unidentified mutations. A test
which detected 70% of CF carriers would identify only 50% of couples
in which both partners carried a deleterious mutation, and who were
therefore at risk of having an affected child. A significant number of
affected children would consequently be born to parents one or both of
whom had received negative carrier test results. Moreover, in about one
in every fifteen couples across the entire US population, one partner
would test positive and the other negative. Since the partner who tested
negative might still carry a deleterious mutation, these couples would
learn that, relative to the rest of the population, they were “at increased
risk (approximately 1 in 500) of bearing a child with cystic fibrosis”
(National Institutes of Health, 1990, p. 70). But what should they make
of that information? Far from clarifying their reproductive options,
there was a danger that carrier screening would leave them in “genetic
limbo”, in the evocative phrase of one science journalist (Roberts, 1990,
p. 1297).
Genetic counselling would help those who underwent cystic fibrosis
carrier testing to make sense of their results. But the sheer volume of
testing that would result from population-wide CF carrier screening
would far exceed the capacity of existing genetic services to provide
such counselling. As early as 1983, when the development of cystic
fibrosis carrier tests first began to look like a realistic prospect, medical
geneticists had warned that “If a test becomes available to identify these
carriers, the demand for genetic screening and counselling could
quickly become overwhelming” (President's Commission, 1983, p. 5).
With the identification of the cystic fibrosis gene and the development
of a test for ΔF508, these warnings acquired a new urgency. If screening
for ΔF508 were rolled out population-wide, one analysis observed, “the
usual standard of care in genetic counselling will not be feasible”
(Wilfond and Fost, 1990, p. 2781. Also e.g. Biesecker et al., 1992). And
in the absence of proper counselling, medical geneticists feared that
those tested would suffer anxiety, distress, and the risk of reproductive
outcomes they might have preferred to avoid. This had implications,
not just for those who underwent screening, but for the very enterprise
of medical genetics. As one geneticist put it, carrier screening could
prove “a mistake and a disservice to the clinical genetics community”
due to the “significant false negative rate. The potential problems that
this may cause, in counselling and medical liability, are enormous. The
possibility that the public's perception, or acceptance, of genetic testing
may be negatively affected by unrealistic expectations of such testing is
real” (Gilbert, 1990, p. 394).
Given these concerns, in November 1989 the American Society of
Human Genetics (ASHG) adopted a statement that while “it will be
appropriate to begin large-scale population screening in the foreseeable
future”, it should not be rolled out until “the test detects a larger pro-
portion of CF carriers and more information is available regarding the
issues surrounding the screening process” (Caskey et al., 1990). By the
spring of 1992, enough additional mutations had been identified to
raise the carrier detection rate to almost 90%. But even this could only
mitigate the problem, not eliminate it. The ASHG therefore repeated its
warning that “CF testing is not recommended, at this time, for in-
dividuals or couples who do not have a family history of CF”, and ad-
vised that population screening be further deferred until a series of pilot
studies had been completed (American Society of Human Genetics,
1992). The Society's position was endorsed by the American Medical
Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists among others, as well as by special workshops convened by the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and by the NIH/Department of
Energy Joint Working Group on the Ethical, Legal and Social Implica-
tions of Human Genome Research (Wilfond and Nolan, 1993, pp.
2951–2952; Cook-Deegan, 1994, pp. 241–246). In view of this con-
certed opposition, population screening for cystic fibrosis carriers re-
mained on hold, at least for the time being.
1.2. The turn to regulation: CLIA88
While professional self-restraint was sufficient to stall the in-
troduction of cystic fibrosis carrier screening, medical geneticists also
began exploring other, more formal means of regulating genetic tests.
Besides calling for deferral of population screening, the ASHG's 1989
statement on CF carrier testing also declared “an immediate need for
centralized quality control of laboratories conducting these tests”
(Caskey et al., 1990). In so doing, it invoked another debate under way
at that time about the regulation, not specifically of genetic tests, but of
medical tests more generally.
In the mid-1980s, theWall Street Journal and other US media outlets
ran a series of reports about laboratories returning unacceptably high
rates of inaccurate or misleading results for cervical smears and other
medical tests. In 1988, Congress responded by passing the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA88), which aimed to
strengthen and extend powers vested in the US Public Health Service,
acting through the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), to impose quality
assurance procedures on laboratories offering medical testing services
(Peddecord and Hammond, 1990). The legislation prompted an ex-
tended process of consultation by the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HCFA)—the Federal agency responsible for implementing
CLIA88—over just how the legislation should be implemented.
Alerted by their concerns about cystic fibrosis testing, clinical ge-
neticists were among those who responded to the consultation. Their
response was informed by their distinctive framing of the potential
harms posed by genetic tests, and of the kinds of measures needed to
mitigate those harms. As originally conceived, CLIA88 focused pri-
marily on ensuring that test results met appropriate standards of ac-
curacy and reliability. The statute therefore identified proficiency
testing—direct monitoring of a laboratory's performance—as “the
central element in determining a laboratory's competence” (quoted in
Peddecord and Hammond, p. 2032), along with more stringent staffing
requirements to ensure that laboratories possessed the technical ex-
pertise to conduct tests accurately. As we have seen, however, clinical
geneticists took the view that accurate test results could still be harmful
if incorrectly interpreted or understood. Their submissions to the con-
sultation reflected this. As Thomas Caskey and Herbert Lubs of the
ASHG observed, genetic tests have “unique features which require in-
terpretation of data on a highly individualized basis for a specific family
or patient. Detailed information about a specific patient or family, and a
complex, computerized program is often required for such interpreta-
tion”. Consequently, they urged, laboratories undertaking genetic tests
should be required to employ staff with recognised competence in
medical genetics, so that test results could be accompanied by a proper
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interpretation of those results; while proficiency testing of participating
laboratories should examine not just the analytical accuracy of test
results but also the quality of the interpretations that accompanied
them (House Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations, 1993, pp. 107–108; see also House
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations,
1993, pp. 115–122).
Clinical geneticists got an opportunity to put these view directly to
legislators in July 1992, when the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
held a special hearing to consider issues in human genetics that re-
mained unresolved under CLIA88. Introducing the hearing, the chair,
Representative Ted Weiss, noted that genetic test results sometimes
“cause needless fear and frustration”, and proposed that measures were
needed “to protect patients, and society as a whole, from the risks in-
herent in genetic testing” (House Subcommittee on Human Resources
and Intergovernmental Relations, 1993, p. 2). Three expert witnesses
from the world of clinical genetics—paediatrician-geneticist Tony
Holtzman, genetic counsellor Elizabeth Gettig and geneticist Paul Bill-
ings—recounted instances of patients who had suffered anxiety, and
sometimes unnecessary medical interventions, as a result of genetic
tests. Increasingly, they argued, family physicians were commissioning
a growing range of genetic tests directly from commercial laboratories.
Often, neither the physician nor the laboratory possessed the expertise
to counsel those tested on the meaning of the results and the courses of
action open to them—hence the anxiety they suffered. To avoid such
problems, Gettig argued, “medical geneticists should be directly in-
volved with reporting of genetic laboratory tests. To have a person with
this specialized training interpret genetic testing is essential” (House
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations,
1993, p. 24). To that end, Holtzman proposed that genetic tests be re-
cognised under CLIA88 “as a separate category requiring its own
standards to assure high quality of laboratory use”, and reiterated
ASHG's recommendation that these standards “must apply to labora-
tories' interpretations of test results … as well as … their performance
of the test” (House Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations, 1993, p. 83).
1.3. Regulatory reform and the institute of Medicine Committee
This same framing of the need for special regulatory measures for
genetic tests would also inform the deliberations of a series of policy
committees over the course of the 1990s. The first of these was con-
vened by the Institute of Medicine (IOM)—part of the National
Academy of Sciences—which in May 1990 set about establishing “a
panel of experts to evaluate issues in the development, application, and
use of tests for genetic disorders”. In proposing this enquiry, the IOM
was moved by many of the same concerns that medical geneticists had
raised about cystic fibrosis carrier screening. Where medical genetics
had previously dealt primarily with individuals “known to be at risk
because of their family history”, the IOM anticipated that developments
in molecular genetics would soon make it possible “to detect abnormal
genes directly, opening the floodgates for predictive genetic screening
for the masses”. Among the diseases the IOM anticipated would be
brought within the scope of predictive genetic testing were not just
cystic fibrosis, but “schizophrenia, alcoholism, and certain cancers”—-
common health problems, with a far higher incidence than the rare
monogenic conditions and birth defects that had previously occupied
medical geneticists. “If these tests become more widespread,” the IOM
noted, “it is doubtful that there will be enough health care professionals
prepared to provide even the most basic counselling required to assist
patient understanding” (National Academy of Sciences, Institute of
Medicine, 1990).
The IOM did not initially include laboratory regulation among the
topics to be considered by the Committee. But when the prospective
members—mostly clinical and molecular geneticists, plus a number of
lawyers, ethicists, and members of patient and civil society organisa-
tions—were canvassed on their views, it became apparent that they
regarded “laboratory quality assurance, including the clouded reg-
ulatory climate” as a “focal issue” (Fullarton, 1991). The Committee
duly added it to their agenda, holding “meetings with federal officials
responsible for implementing federal regulations under … CLIA88”
(IOM, Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks, 1994, pp. 10–11). Its
report, published in 1994, echoed the recommendations that had been
put to the House Subcommittee two years earlier. Noting that “existing
CLIA88 regulations … are not being applied to genetic testing at all”,
the Committee again urged that the rules be revised to incorporate
special requirements for genetic testing laboratories, including em-
ployment of appropriately qualified laboratory personnel, and reg-
ulatory oversight of the interpretation as well as the accuracy of test
results (IOM, Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks, 1994, pp. 11;
136–138).
CLIA88 was a late addition to the Committee's agenda. But the IOM
had another set of regulatory provisions in its sights from the start.
Among the topics initially proposed for consideration was “the ability
of the Federal [sic.] Drug Administration (FDA) to guide the evaluation
of the efficacy, sensitivity and reliability of tests given the unique
complexity of genetic disease” (National Academy of Sciences, Institute
of Medicine, 1990). This opened a second line of approach for the ge-
neticists on the Committee to engage with regulatory questions, while
maintaining the same overall framing of the issues.
The US Food and Drug Administration had long been empowered to
regulate the marketing of diagnostic tests, but exercised those powers
with a notably light touch. FDA confined its regulatory oversight to
tests sold as kits and to commercially-marketed reagents, leaving tests
sold as laboratory services to be regulated under CLIA. And even where
test kits were concerned, FDA sought as far as possible to work co-
operatively with manufacturers rather than impose strict standards
(Merrill, 1996, p. 1812). In practice, diagnostic tests often reached the
market after only the most cursory regulatory scrutiny. In the case of
“genetic testing kits and associated genetic test reagents and DNA
probes,” the IOM Committee noted in its 1994 report, “such tests are
rarely being submitted to FDA for approval.” Given the risks they as-
sociated with genetic tests, the Committee considered this un-
satisfactory. Consequently, they recommended that FDA use the powers
at its disposal to ensure the “safety and effectiveness” of genetic tests by
requiring all new genetic tests to undergo full premarket assessment
procedures (IOM, Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks, 1994, pp.
11–13). More than this, however, in keeping with their framing of the
distinctive informational risks associated with genetic tests, they re-
commended that FDA also require manufacturers to provide sig-
nificantly more information about their tests than was demanded for
other kinds of diagnostic devices.
Manufacturers seeking approval for a diagnostic test were normally
expected to provide evidence that it accurately measured what it
claimed to measure, that the results were “clinically significant”, and
that the numbers of false positive and false negative results it generated
were within acceptable limits. They were not usually expected to pro-
vide information about how a test should be used (Gutman, 1999, pp.
747–748). This was a matter of deliberate FDA policy. Congress had
repeatedly declared that the legislation authorising FDA to regulate
medical products was not intended to regulate medical practice. FDA
interpreted this to mean that they should not seek to influence how
doctors chose to use diagnostic devices (Huang, 1998, p. 574; Evans,
2006, p. 775). In 1987, for instance, discussing FDA's role in relation to
new DNA tests for infectious disease agents, FDA Commissioner Frank
Young had stated: “The FDA … cannot decide for practitioners when a
test is appropriate, and under what circumstances any particular test
should be used … The FDA does not have or should not have a direct
regulatory role in the practice of a physician.” Rather, it was up to
medical professionals to “learn more about the utility and reliability of
tests, know and contact medical specialty colleagues familiar with the
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tests; be familiar with the technical literature; and attend professional
meetings” (Young, 1987, p. 2405). So far as FDA were concerned,
medical professionals could be expected to possess or acquire the ex-
pertise they needed to use it safely and effectively.
This was precisely what medical geneticists doubted: most practi-
tioners, they feared, were simply not equipped to interpret and com-
municate the results of genetic tests in ways which did not endanger
their patients. The IOM Committee therefore recommended that FDA's
premarket approval procedures for genetic tests should be enhanced to
minimise that risk. Manufacturers should be required to indicate “the
intended and potential use(s) of the test (e.g., presymptomatic diagnosis
or prediction, carrier screening, prenatal diagnosis)”, and to provide
relevant data “for each intended use”. Additionally, manufacturers
should provide a “description to be given to health care providers and
to patients regarding the objectives of the test and the interpretations of
negative or positive findings” (IOM, Committee on Assessing Genetic
Risks, 1994, pp. 139–140). In effect, FDA's premarket approval proce-
dures should be revised to ensure practitioners received guidance on
when and how to use genetic tests and how to interpret the results to
their patients.
The IOM Committee thus developed a two-prong regulatory strategy
to address the problems it associated with genetic tests, using both
CLIA88 and FDA's medical device regulations. The members would
have been well aware that the regulatory agencies were unwilling to
take on additional responsibilities, however. At the same July 1992
meeting of the House Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations addressed by Holtzman, Gettig and
Billings, representatives from CDC, HCFA and FDA also attended to
answer questions about their oversight of genetic tests. Their testimony
was not encouraging. Asked about plans to implement CLIA88, the
HCFA representative revealed that no measures were being taken to
ensure that laboratories employed personnel with the expertise to in-
terpret genetic tests, while proficiency testing was awaiting the for-
mulation of programmes that HCFA deemed could be rolled out na-
tionally; asked whether, in the specific case of cytogenetics, this was
likely to take years or decades, the CDC representative declined to offer
an estimate (House Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations, 1993, pp. 123–129). As for FDA regula-
tion of genetic tests: the FDA representative said that the agency was
aware that many test kits were being used for purposes that had not
been approved, and declared that FDA had recently “put the industry on
notice” that such use needed to be brought under control. However, the
representative noted, the tests had already “reached a level of clinical
acceptability”, and FDA was anxious to “avoid completely upsetting the
current status of the use of the testing” so that “reasonable medical use
of these products is not destroyed” (House Subcommittee on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, 1993, pp. 130–132). The
chair could only express his exasperation. “The FDA was created not for
the benefit of manufacturers; the FDA was created for the benefit of the
American people”, he complained. “When the [regulatory] process gets
in the way of protecting their health and safety and allows for patients
to be given misinformation, then the agency charged with protecting
the public is misusing its mandate from Congress.” (House Sub-
committee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, p.
133).
1.4. Towards utility: the NIH-DOE Task Force and SACGT
Despite heel-dragging by the regulatory agencies, the IOM
Committee's framing of the need for stricter regulation of genetic
testing struck a chord, not least among proponents of the human
genome project. Much of the funding for the IOM Committee had come
from the joint National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Department of
Energy (DOE) budget for research into the ethical, legal and social
implications (ELSI) of human genome science. Following publication of
the IOM Committee's report, the NIH-DOE ELSI Working Group decided
to set up its own Task Force on Genetic Testing to conduct further in-
vestigations and “when necessary, make recommendations to ensure
the development of safe and effective genetic tests” (Task Force on
Genetic Testing, 1997, ch. 1). The Task Force published its draft re-
commendations for comment in January 1997 (National Institutes of
Health, 1997), and released its Final Report in the following October.
Among its recommendations, the Task Force proposed that the Secre-
tary of State for Health and Human Services appoint her own expert
committee to advise on policy development. The Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Genetic Testing (SACGT) was duly chartered in June
1998 (National Institutes of Health, Office of Science Policy, n.d.), and
released its first set of proposals for “Enhancing the oversight of genetic
tests” in July 2000 (SACGT, 2000).
The successive committees charted a trajectory through the orbits of
government policy-making, from the academic detachment of the IOM
committee to SACGT in the office of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. At the same time, the balance of interests represented in the
committees shifted to include a larger contingent of stakeholders and
policy experts (Parthasarathy, 2007, p. 40). By the time the SACGT was
appointed, medical geneticists and genetic counsellors were in a min-
ority. Nonetheless, the chair continued to be held by a medical ge-
neticist, and the overall framing of the issues around genetic tests re-
mained largely constant. Like the IOM committee, the Task Force and
SACGT maintained that genetic tests needed to be properly interpreted
and communicated if they were not to harm those undergoing testing,
and feared that the proliferation of such tests beyond the immediate
interpretative control of medical geneticists posed a real risk. However,
the precise locus of concern within that frame shifted somewhat from
the IOM Committee to the Task Force then the SACGT, as did the re-
lative weight the committees gave to different kinds of regulatory so-
lutions.
On the one hand, the Task Force and the SACGT were more san-
guine than the IOM committee about the ability of non-geneticists to
make safe use of genetic tests. “Even when aware that a problem that
concerns them might have a genetic origin, they [patients] are more
likely to seek the care of the specialist who manages the problem when
it becomes overt than the care of a geneticist”, noted the Task Force.
“Consequently, non-genetic specialists, as well as primary care provi-
ders, become the gateway to genetic testing.” But far from being feared,
this should be welcomed. “With proper training and adequate knowl-
edge of test validity, disease and mutation frequencies in the ethnic
groups to whom they provide care, primary care providers and other
non-genetic specialists can and should be the ones to offer predictive
genetic tests to at-risk individuals”. Measures would need to be put in
place to ensure that practitioners received the necessary training, in-
cluding not just technical knowledge of genetics and genetic tests, but
also a practical appreciation of “the means of communicating genetic
concepts and risks to patients”. But the Task Force noted that such
measures were already being implemented by a range of professional
and policy bodies, and simply urged that these measures be encouraged
and supported (Task Force on Genetic Testing, 1997, ch. 4).
On the other hand, the committee reports reflected growing concern
at the accelerating commercialisation of genetic tests and testing. “Until
the 1980s”, the Task Force observed, “most genetic and cytogenetic
testing was performed in the laboratories of non-profit organisations,
most of them in academic medical centers. These labs were often di-
rected by the same professionals who cared for patients. In the last
decade, genetic testing has been commercialized. As a result, providers
who were close to patients and families at risk of illness might not have
as much influence on testing policy as they once did” (Task Force on
Genetic Testing, 1997, ch. 1). Geneticists worried that, in the absence of
professional oversight, companies might market their tests without re-
gard for the possible harms to patients—a fear that was boosted from
the mid-1990s as biotechnology company Myriad launched an ag-
gressive programme of direct-to-consumer advertising and market
monopolisation of its tests for the breast cancer susceptibility genes
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BRCA1 and BRCA2 (Malinowski and Blatt, 1997; Parthasarathy, 2007,
pp. 58–92; Baldwin and Cook-Deegan, 2013).
As the committees' anxieties shifted to focus on the expanding
commercial sector, so they looked increasingly to external regulatory
agencies to mitigate those anxieties. This included repeating the IOM
committee's calls to strengthen oversight of genetic testing laboratories
under CLIA88: laboratories should be required, among other things, to
return genetic test results “in a form that is understandable to the non-
geneticist health care provider”, and to employ staff with adequate
training and experience in genetics to provide such interpretations
(Task Force on Genetic Testing, 1997, ch. 3). The relevant agencies
appeared increasingly willing to implement such changes. By the time
SACGT reported in 2000, HCFA and CDC were “taking steps to develop
more specific laboratory requirements for genetic testing under CLIA,
including provisions for the pre- and post-analytical phases of the
testing process” (SACGT, 2000, p. 9). This included drafting proposals
that laboratories should not just report the results of genetic tests, but
should also provide an interpretation; and that laboratories be required
to employ staff “capable of providing genetic counselling to the labor-
atory's clients (care providers, patients, individuals, etc.)” (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2000, p. 25932).
The Task Force and SACGT also called for FDA to do more to reg-
ulate genetic tests. On this issue, they went significantly beyond what
the IOM committee had recommended. As we have seen, the IOM
Committee had proposed that FDA's premarket approval procedures be
expanded to include information about the intended use of genetic tests
and about how to interpret the results. However, there are indications
that the IOM Committee was leaning towards stronger regulatory
measures. FDA approval of diagnostics and other devices was generally
understood to depend on evidence of “safety and effectiveness”. Twice
in its report, however, the IOM Committee referred instead to the need
to assess the “safety, effectiveness, and clinical utility” of genetic tests,
and particularly screening tests (IOM, Committee on Assessing Genetic
Risks, 1994, pp. 13; 142, emphasis added). It also observed that tests for
inherited predispositions to common disorders such as heart disease
and cancer would raise additional regulatory challenges, since such
disorders “will vary in treatability, thereby affecting the utility of the
information to be gained even from highly predictive tests” (IOM,
Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks, 1994, p. 296). The Committee
nowhere specified what it meant by “clinical utility”. However, the fact
that it arose specifically in relation to screening tests and the avail-
ability of effective treatment recalls geneticists' long-standing framing
of the harms that ill-considered or badly administered genetic tests
could cause. It also indicates that geneticists were beginning to consider
additional ways of mitigating such harms: where previously they had
focused primarily on the communicative technology of genetic coun-
selling, they were now thinking also of how regulatory agencies, and
especially FDA, could act to ensure that tests were delivered in ways
that brought benefit rather than harm to those tested.
This became explicit in the deliberations of the Task Force. “Before a
genetic test can be generally accepted in clinical practice, data must be
collected to demonstrate the benefits and risks that accrue from both
positive and negative results,” it declared. To that end, tests should be
assessed according to three key criteria: analytic validity, clinical va-
lidity, and clinical utility. Premarket approval procedures should
therefore include data on “the test's utility for individuals who are tested”;
while “the clinical use of a genetic test must be based on evidence that
… the test results will be useful to the people being tested” (Task Force on
Genetic Testing, 1997, ch. 2, emphasis added). SACGT concurred, while
adding a fourth criterion of evaluation: “Analytical validity, clinical
validity, clinical utility, and social consequences should be the major
criteria used to assess the benefits and risks of genetic tests”, declared
the committee (SACGT, 2000, p. viii). FDA should therefore “delineate
review processes for pre-market evaluation of genetic tests. These
processes should focus on evaluation of the data regarding analytical
and clinical validity, as well as on claims made by the developer of the
test about its clinical utility” (SACGT, 2000, p. x).
Both committees also inclined to the view that this should apply, not
just to the test kits and reagents that FDA currently chose to regulate,
but also to tests sold as laboratory services. As the Task Force noted,
“Under the CLIA, clinical laboratories must demonstrate analytical va-
lidity of their tests but there is no statutory or regulatory requirement
for them to establish the clinical validity or utility of clinical laboratory
tests” (National Institutes of Health, 1997, p. 4544). Consequently, the
Task Force initially proposed that FDA expand its remit by requiring
“all organisations developing new, predictive genetic tests” to undergo
full premarket assessment, “regardless of whether their sponsor's in-
tention is to market [those tests] as services or as kits” (National
Institutes of Health, 1997, pp. 4541, 4544). However, a minority of
Task Force members dissented from this proposal (National Institutes of
Health, 1997, p. 4544), which was replaced in the final report with a
recommendation that “Testing organisations should comply volunta-
rily” with this requirement (Task Force on Genetic Testing, 1997, ch. 2).
SACGT showed no such ambivalence, stating categorically that “FDA
should be the federal agency responsible for the review, approval, and
labeling of all new genetic tests that have moved beyond the basic re-
search phase” (SACGT, 2000, p. x), including tests marketed as services
as well as those sold as test kits (SACGT, 2000, p. 10).
2. Discussion
The idea that genetic tests should be assessed for utility before being
approved for clinical practice took shape over the course of the 1990s in
a series of policy committees beginning with the IOM Committee on
Assessing Genetic Risks and ending with the Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Genetic Testing. It was informed by medical geneticists'
distinctive framing of genetic tests and the harms they could pose, both
to those tested and to the enterprise of medical genetics itself. That
framing originated in the 1970s, driven by geneticists' concern to
counter public mistrust due to their long association with eugenics, and
continued to shape their attitudes to testing through the 1990s. Within
that framing, however, geneticists adjusted their ideas about how best
to mitigate the potential harms of genetic testing in response to chan-
ging circumstances. Initially they concentrated on keeping genetic
testing procedures under their own specialist control, subject to skilled
genetic counselling. But by the mid-1990s, they were coming to accept
that more and more genetic tests would be marketed by commercial
organisations and delivered by practitioners lacking any special ex-
pertise in genetics. Faced with their inability to control how and when
genetic tests were used, medical geneticists now called on regulatory
agencies, particularly FDA, to ensure that tests were used in ways that
benefited rather than harmed those tested. They adopted the language
of “clinical utility” to capture this idea of benefit.
Following the history of these regulatory initiatives from the per-
spective of frame theory thus helps to understand why concerns about
the clinical utility of medical tests were first articulated specifically in
relation to genetic tests. It also serves to highlight the socio-historical
specificity of medical geneticists' concerns. Present-day claims that
genetic tests require different regulatory and governance arrangements
from other kinds of medical tests—often dubbed “genetic ex-
ceptionalism” (e.g. Murray, 1997; Garrison et al., 2019)—are usually
justified in terms of the distinctive characteristics of genetic informa-
tion. In particular, advocates of enhanced regulation of genetic tests
argue that they provide information about the present and future
health, not only of the individual tested, but also of that individual's
genetic relatives; and as such, they pose an especially acute risk of
medical and other kinds of discrimination. These were not the concerns
that prompted the regulatory initiatives documented in the present
paper, however.
From the 1970s onwards, a major part of the practice of medical
genetics involved prenatal testing for birth defects including Down
syndrome and neural tube defects. In most cases, these conditions do
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not have a significant familial component. Nonetheless, such tests fea-
tured prominently in geneticists' anxieties about genetic testing from
the Committee for the Study of Inborn Errors of Metabolism in the
1970s to debates over implementing CLIA88 in the early 1990s.
Meanwhile, insofar as medical geneticists also dealt with familial con-
ditions such as cystic fibrosis during this period, they encountered them
principally through clinical observation of individual cases and affected
families. The testing technologies available at that time served merely
to refine what was already known about family history or, in the case of
phenylketonuria, to facilitate early diagnosis of what would soon be-
come clinically apparent even in the absence of testing. Consequently,
genetic tests revealed little about health or reproductive risks that re-
latives could not know by other means: family history was informative
about genetic tests, rather than vice versa.
Instead, as we have seen, medical geneticists' framing of the dangers
of genetic testing focused on the interpretative and inter-personal
challenges of communicating complex and often uncertain information
about risk, and on the anxiety and suspicion that unnecessary or poorly
conducted tests could cause. This remained their principal worry into
the early 1990s, evident for instance in Caskey and Lubs's character-
isation of genetic tests as having “unique features which require in-
terpretation of data on a highly individualized basis for a specific family
or patient” (House Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations, 1993, p. 107). As the identification of
ΔF508 then other pathogenic mutations made it possible to test for
more and more genetic susceptibilities in the absence of any prior
knowledge of family history, so concern about the implications of test
results for genetic relatives was included within the wider framing of
geneticists' anxieties about communicating genetic risk. But their view
that genetic tests pose exceptional informational risks far predates the
kinds of technical capabilities, and specifically the ability to reveal
previously unknown information about family members, that are cur-
rently held to justify genetic exceptionalism. Instead, it can be traced
back to the early 1970s and the particular predicament in which
medical geneticists, eager to expand their practice while distancing
themselves from eugenics, found themselves at that time.
Historical framing analysis thus alerts us to how the concerns of the
past may inform the present in ways not immediately visible to con-
temporary actors. At the same time, it also illuminates the limits of that
shaping, particularly as ideas and actions are adopted beyond their
frame of origin. This is evident from the way the idea of clinical utility
has actually been implemented in relation to genetic tests in the years
since 2000. Official adoption of medical geneticists' calls for genetic
testing to be made conditional on evidence of clinical utility has been
piecemeal at best, despite a huge increase in both the range of tests
available and the complexity of the genetic information they produce.
The Office of Public Health Genomics, established in 1997 as a spe-
cialist office of the CDC, incorporated the recommendation into its
ACCE (Analytic validity, Clinical validity, Clinical utility and Ethical,
social and legal implications) framework in 2000 (Centers for Disease
Control, n.d.; Haddow and Palomaki, 2003). Subsequently rolled out
under the Evaluation of Genomic Applications in Practice and Preven-
tion (EGAPP) initiative (Teutsch et al., 2009), ACCE assessment has
been important in shaping genetic testing as an instrument of public
health surveillance (Green et al., 2015). By contrast, FDA has continued
to resist taking responsibility for regulating genetic tests (Javitt, 2007),
with one partial exception. In 2006, FDA issued draft guidance on
regulating a specific class of laboratory-developed genetic tests: so-
called in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays (IVDMIAs). How-
ever, Pascale Bourret and colleagues have argued that FDA's embrace of
clinical utility as a criterion for assessing IVDMIAs was principally due
to researchers' need to standardise outcome measures for clinical trials
of novel “personalised” therapies (Bourret et al., 2011; Cambrosio et al.,
2017), rather than a concern to protect patients from the risks of ge-
netic testing. This is consistent with FDA's reinterpretation of its reg-
ulatory remit as being to foster innovation—for which IVDMIAs hold
particular promise—as much as to control the market for medical
products (Hogarth, 2015). But it also points to a wider issue sur-
rounding the idea of “clinical utility”.
Neither the Task Force nor the SACGT specified just what kind of
evidence would serve to demonstrate the clinical utility of genetic tests.
Even the expectation that it include evidence of benefit to those tested,
implicit in the committees' overall framing of the risks attending genetic
testing, was rarely stated overtly. As the idea of assessing genetic tests
for clinical utility was adopted beyond the confines of the policy
committees, so it escaped that distinctive framing and began to acquire
different connotations. Most notably, the emphasis on assessing harms
and benefits to the individuals undergoing testing was progressively
weakened. Thus CDC's EGAPP initiative called for “evidence that test
results can change patient management decisions and improve net
health outcomes (clinical utility)” (Teutsch et al., 2009, p. 6). In the
case of FDA's regulation of IVDMIAs, it appears that utility refers even
more narrowly to the ability to inform doctors' treatment decisions,
especially in clinical research settings (Bourret et al., 2011; Cambrosio
et al., 2017).
Meanwhile other organisations, including professional bodies and
healthcare providers, have enacted more pervasive regulation of ge-
netic tests through informal governance arrangements such as clinical
practice guidelines and health technology assessment procedures (Pitini
et al., 2018). While many of these organisations have incorporated
clinical utility into their assessment criteria, they varied in just how
they evaluated utility (Bossuyt, 2011), with clinical and economic ef-
fectiveness often taking precedence over evidence of benefit to in-
dividual patients or improved patient outcomes (Smart, 2006). Indeed,
of the many genetic tests that have since made their way into clinical
practice, many do not even offer improved health outcomes—a case in
point being the “arms race” between companies competing to sell tests
for more and more cystic fibrosis gene variants, despite the uncertain
clinical significance of many of those variants (Grody et al., 2007). In
this regard, the proliferation and increasing complexity of genetic tests
and the information they provide is probably best seen, not as excep-
tional, but if anything as exemplary of a more general movement to
place data production and management at the heart of modern
healthcare.
Faced with these changing conditions of practice, as well as the
growth of direct-to-consumer genetic tests of little or no medical value,
some social scientists have begun to argue that the concept of “utility”
should be expanded to include the public good arising from research
conducted on the genetic data accumulated by such means (Turrini and
Prainsack, 2016; Haeusermann et al., 2017). This new idea of utility,
with its assumption that genetic tests can serve the public good in-
dependently of delivering individual benefits, stands in marked contrast
to medical geneticists' earlier framing of the potential harms of genetic
tests, and especially their insistence that tests be delivered in ways that
prioritised the needs and wishes of those tested. In their efforts to re-
pudiate eugenics, those geneticists insisted in effect that risk of harm to
individuals should outweigh any claims regarding public benefit. While
present-day commentators envisage very different kinds of public good
from eugenics, the question of how to balance such goods against in-
dividual harms remains pressing—perhaps even more so as the possible
harms of genetic testing appear to slip off the regulatory agenda.
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